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TAMÁS SOLYMOSIy, STEF TIJS, AND JOAN PERE VILLARz
Abstract
Neighbour games arise from certain matching or sequencing situations
in which only some specific pairs of players can obtain a positive gain.
As a consequence, neighbour games are as well assignment games as line
graph restricted games. We will show that the intersection of the class of
assignment games and the class of line graph restricted games yields the
class of neighbour games.
Further, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity
of neighbour games. In spite of the possible non-convexity of neighbour
games, it turns out that for any neighbour game the extreme points of the
core are marginal vectors. Moreover, we prove this for assignment games
in general. Hence, for any assignment game the core is the convex hull of
some marginal vectors.
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In this paper we introduce a class of cooperative games, called neighbour games,
and show that these games satisfy the CoMa-property, i.e. the core of these
games is the convex hull of some marginal vectors. Moreover, we prove that all
assignment games (cf. [10]) satisfy the CoMa-property.
The appealing feature of the CoMa-property is that the extreme points of the
core are exactly those marginal vectors that are in the core. Hence, for these
games it is rather easy to generate core elements. A well-known class of games
that satisfies the CoMa-property is the class of convex games: the core of a convex
game is the convex hull of all marginal vectors, (cf. [9], [5]). A non-convex class
of games that satisfies the CoMa-property is the class of information games, (cf.
[6]), which is a subclass of minimum cost spanning tree games (cf. [3]).
The following two examples describe situations that give rise to neighbour
games. In the first example we consider a sequencing situation in which customers
are lined in a queue and waiting for a taxi. The taxi company that provides the
service has two types of cars: one that transports only one customer (type A) and
one that can only transport two customers (type B). The first customer in the queue
can decide to pick a taxi of type A or wait for the next customer in the queue. In
the latter case they decide both to share a taxi of type B or the second customer
will wait on the third customer. In the latter case the first customer has to pick a
taxi of type A. This procedure is repeated until all customers are transported in a
taxi. Since the costs of sharing a taxi of type B are lower than taking two taxis of
type A, it is obvious that the customers can save costs by sharing a taxi of type B.
However, each customer faces the problem that the cost of a taxi (of type B) is not
fixed, because it depends on the trip to bring the customers to the right locations.
Hence, we have that only customers that are neighbours in the queue can obtain
cost savings, and customers that take a taxi of type A have cost savings equal to
zero. All customers in the queue want to choose a combination of taxis of type A
and B such that their cost savings are maximized. Moreover, they looking for an
allocation of these cost savings that satisfies some specific properties.
The second example can be viewed as a restricted matching problem. Suppose
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a river runs through several countries. To be able to utilize this cheap transporta-
tion possibility, harbours have to be built. Each country is able, from financial
viewpoint, to build at most one harbour. Neighbour countries might join to build a
harbour at their border (which then can serve both countries) and save costs. The
countries are interested in maximizing their cost savings and finding some proper
allocation of these cost savings.
For analysing both examples we can use cooperative game theory, since one
of the topics in cooperative game theory is the investigation of the stability of
allocation rules, i.e. whether the allocation is contained in the core of the related
cooperative game. For this purpose we introduce neighbour games.
A neighbour game can be viewed as an assignment game and as a -component
additive game (cf. [2]). The latter one is a special type of  -component additive
game (cf. [8]) where the restricted graph is a line graph.
More precisely, we show that the intersection of these two classes of games
yield the class of neighbour games. As a consequence, neighbour games has
many appealing properties, such as: the core is a non-empty set and coincides
with the set of competitive equilibria ([10]), the core is equal to the bargaining set
and the nucleolus coincides with the kernel ([8]), the existence of easy algorithms
to calculate the nucleolus for neighbour games ([4]). Besides, neighbour games
satisfy the already mentioned CoMa-property and some egaliterian solutions can
be easily obtained ([4]).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the necessary definitions
of the relevant games and presents the intersection result. Convexity and the CoMa-
property of neighbour games are discussed in Section 3. Finally, the proof of the
CoMa-property of assignment games is provided in Section 4.
4
2 Neighbour games: assignment games and compo-
nent additive games
In this section we introduce neighbour games. We show that the intersection of the
class of assignment games and the class of -component additive games results in
the class of neighbour games. Before we present this result we need the following
notions from cooperative game theory.
A transferable utility cooperative game is an ordered pair (P; v) where P =
f1; :::; pg is a finite set of players and v : 2P ! IR is a map that assigns to each
coalition S 2 2P a real number v(S), such that v(;) = 0. Here 2P is the collection
of all subsets (coalitions) of P .
Assignment games, introduced by Shapley and Shubik ([10]), arise from bi-
partite matching situations. Let M and N be two disjoint sets. For each i 2 M
and j 2 N the value of a matched pair (i; j) is aij  0. From this situation an
assignment game is defined in the following way. On the player set M [ N , the
worth of coalition S [ T; S  M;T  N (that will be denoted by (S; T ) later
on) is defined to be the maximum that (S; T ) can achieve by making suitable pairs
from its members. If S = ; or T = ; no suitable pairs can be made and therefore
the worth in this situation is 0. Formally, an assignment game ((M;N); v) is
defined for all (S; T ); S M;T  N by
v(S; T ) = maxf
X
(i;j)2
aij j  2 M(S; T )g;
where M(S; T ) denotes the set of matchings between S and T .
Component additive games, introduced by Curiel et al. ([2]), are a special class
of -component additive games, discussed in ([8]), which in turn are a special class
of graph restricted games in the sense of Owen ([7]). Let (P; v) be a cooperative
game and let   = (P;E) be a undirected line graph. Then a component additive





where Sn  is the set of connected components of S with respect to  .
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The situations discussed in the introduction that motivate the interests for
neighbour games, give rise to a model in which players are lined up in a one-
dimensional queue. In this queue, players can only directly cooperate with at most
one of their neighbours in this queue. From this point of view neighbour games
are defined as restricted assignment games: only pairs that are neighbours in the
queue can be matched. Formally, let P be the player set and  : P ! f1; :::; pg be
an order on P . Obviously, P can be partioned in M and N such that M contains
the players in odd positions and N the players in even positions according to .
Let aij  0 if the players i 2M; j 2 N in the pair (i; j) are neighbours, i.e. either
(j) = (i) + 1 or (i) = (j), and aij = 0 otherwise. Then a neighbour game
is defined for all (S; T ); S M;T  N by
w(S; T ) = maxf
X
(i;j)2
aij j  2 N (S; T )g;
where N (S; T ) is the set of matchings between S and T in which each matching
only consists of pairs (i; j) that are neighbours.
Example 2.1 Let P = f1; 2; 3; 4g be the player set and let  describe the order
1  2  3  4. The pairs that are neighbours with respect to  are (1,2),
(3,2) and (3,4). Hence, all other pairs have a worth equal to zero. Take, for
instance, a12 = 1; a32 = 2; and a34 = 3. Then the corresponding neighbour game
(M [ N;w), where M = f1; 3g and N = f2; 4g, is depicted in Table 2.1.
S f1,2g f1,2,3g f1,2,4g f1,3,4g f2,3g f2,3,4g f3,4g f1,2,3,4g
w(S) 1 2 1 3 2 3 3 4
Table 2.1: a neighbour game.
2
Let (P;w) be a neighbour game that arises from an order  and let (P;w ) be
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the component additive game that arises from this neighbour game and the line
graph   in which the vertices are ordered according to . It easy to verify that
w(S) = w (S) for all S  P . Hence, from the definition of neighbour games and
this latter argument we conclude that any neighbour game is as well an assignment
game as a component additive game. The next Proposition shows that also the
reverse holds.
Proposition 2.2 Let NB, A; and CA be the classes of neighbour games, assign-
ment games, and component additive games, respectively, consisting of n players.
Then
NB = A \ CA:
PROOF: From the argument before Proposition 2.2 and the definition of neighbour
games as restricted assignment games if follows that we only need to show that
A \ CA  NB:
Let (P; v) 2 A\CA. Since (P; v) 2 A there exists a partition P = (M;N) and a
non-negative matrix [aij](i;j)2(M;N) that generates (P; v). Since (P; v) 2 CA, there
exists a line graph   that orders the players according to some map . Because
v(fig) = 0 for all i 2 P , we have that v(fi; jg) = 0 whenever i and j are not
neighbours with respect to . Since v(fi; jg) = aij we can conclude that (P; v) is
a neighbour game. 2
3 On the extreme points of the core of neighbour
games
In this section we investigate the core of neighbour games. We will present the
result that the core of a neighbour game is the convex hull of the marginal vectors
that are in the core of the game. This property is henceforth called the CoMa-
property. As a consequence, we have that each extreme point of the core coincides
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with at least one marginal vector. Moreover, we give a necessary and sufficient
condition for the convexity of neighbour games. Before we state this result we
will recall the notions of the core, convexity, and introduce the CoMa-property.
The core of a game (P; v) consists of all vectors that distribute the gains v(P )
obtained by P among the players in such a way that no subset of players can be
better off by seceding from the rest of the players and act on their own behalf.
Formally, the core of a game (P; v) is
Core(v) = fx 2 IRP j x(S)  v(S) for all S  P and x(P ) = v(P )g;
where x(S) =
P
i2S xi. In general, the core may be an empty set. A game is
called balanced whenever its core is non-empty.
Assignment games and component additive games are both balanced games.
As a consequence of Proposition 2.2, neighbour games are also balanced. More-
over, Potters and Reijnierse ([8]) showed that for  -component additive games, in
which   is a tree, the bargaining set coincides with the core and the kernel coin-
cides with the nucleolus. Hence, these two features also hold for neighbour games.
Moreover, Raghavan and Solymosi ([11]) provided an algorithm to calculate the
nucleolus of assignment games. This algorithm has been simplified by Hamers et
al. ([4]) to calculate the nucleolus of neighbour games.
In this section we concentrate on the extreme points of the core of neighbour
games. We need the notion of a marginal vector of a game (P; v). Let (P ) be
the set of all permutations of P = f1; 2; :::; pg. Then the i-th coordinate of the
marginal vector m(v) is defined by
mi (v) = v(fj 2 P j (j)  (i)g)  v(fj 2 P j (j) < (i)g):
Now, we are able to define the CoMa-property for a cooperative game. A game
(P; v) satisfies the Core is convex hull of Marginals (CoMa-) property if
Core(v) = convfm(v) j m(v) 2 Core(v)g: (1)
Hence, the CoMa-property yields that the core is the convex hull of some marginal
vectors.
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A well-known class of games that satisfy the CoMa-property is the class of convex
games. A game (P; v) is called convex if for all i 2 P and all coalitions S and T
with S  T  Pnfig it holds that
v(T [ fig)  v(T )  v(S [ fig)  v(S):
Shapley ([9]) and Ichiishi ([5]) showed that a game is convex if and only if each
marginal vector is an extreme point of the core. From this result the CoMa-property
follows immediately, since the core is a convex set.
The next example shows that neighbour games need not be convex.
Example 3.1 Consider the player set M = f1; 3g, N = f2g and let the values of
the neighbour pairs be a12 = 2 and a32 = 1: Then the worth of the coalitions of
the corresponding neighbour game ((M;N); w) is given in Table 3.1.
S f1g f2g f3g f1,2g f1,3g f2,3g f1,2,3g
w(S) 0 0 0 2 0 1 2
Table 3.1: a non-convex neighbour game.
Take  such that (1) = 3; (2) = 1; and (3) = 2.
Then m(w) = (1; 0; 1) 62 Core(w). Hence ((M;N); w) is not convex. 2
The following Proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the
convexity of neighbour games.
Proposition 3.2 Let P be a player set that is partitioned intoM andN according
to the order  : 1  2  :::  n. Let ((M;N); w) be the corresponding neighbour
game. Then ((M;N); w) is convex if and only if for any triple j   1; j; j + 1 2
P of consecutive players according to  it holds that w(fj   1; jg) = 0 or
w(fj; j + 1g) = 0.
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PROOF: We first prove the ’only if’ part. Suppose that w(fj   1; jg) > 0 and
w(fj; j + 1g) > 0 for some j 2 P . Then
w(fj   1; j; j + 1g)  w(fj   1; jg)
= maxfw(fj   1; jg); w(fj; j + 1g)g   w(fj   1; jg)
= maxf0; w(fj; j + 1g)  w(fj   1; jg)g
< w(fj; j + 1g)  w(fjg):
Hence, (P;w) is not convex.
Second, we prove the ’if’ part. For any S  T  P and k 2 PnT we have








= w(S [ fkg)  w(S);




fk   1; k + 1g if k 6= 1; n
f2g if k = 1
fn  1g if k = n
2
Although neighbour games need not be convex, they satisfy the CoMa-property.
Theorem 3.3 Neighbour games satisfy the CoMa-property.
The proof is omitted since Theorem 3.3 is an immediate consequence of Proposi-
tion 2.2 and Theorem 4.5 of the next section.
4 On the extreme points of the core of assignment
games
In this section we show that assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property. We first
show that we can restrict attention to assignment games in which the cardinality
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of the disjoint sets that have to be matched are equal. After that we provide
a relation between the extreme points in the core of assignment games and the
components of the corresponding tight graph. Finally, we provide the proof of the
CoMa-property. However, before we can provide the proof of this result, we need
some preparations.
Let ((M;N); w) be an assignment game. Then an allocation of the grand
coalition, w(M;N), will sometimes, for convenience, be denoted by (u; v) 2
IRM  IRN , where u and v are the vectors that correspond to the payoffs of the
players in M and N , respectively.
The following Lemma, due to Shapley and Shubik ([9]), shows that each pair
(i; j) that is in an optimal matching betweenM andN shares in any core allocation
the reward aij .
Lemma 4.1 Let ((M;N); w) be an assignment game and let  be an optimal
matching between M and N . Then for any (i; j) 2  and (u; v) 2 Core(w) it
holds that ui + vj = w(fi; jg).
As a consequence of Lemma 4.1, each player that is not matched in an optimal
matching betweenM and N obtains in each core allocation a payoff equal to zero.
Let ((M;N); w) be an assignment game in which jM j<j N j. Let  be an op-
timal matching betweenM andN . Then  induces a setNM  N such thatM and
NM are completely matched, which implies that jM j=j NM j. If ((M;NM ); w)
is the restricted assignment game of ((M;N); w)), then it is straightforward to
verify that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the extreme points of
their cores, i.e. x 2 extfCore(w)g if and only if y 2 extfCore(w)g, where
yi = xi if i 2 M [ NM and yi = 0 otherwise. The following Lemma shows that
it is sufficient to prove the CoMa-property for assignment games that arise from
situations in which jM j=j N j.
Lemma 4.2 Let ((M;N); w) be an assignment game in which j M j<j N j and
let ((M;NM ); w) be the restricted assignment game. If ((M;NM ); w) satisfies the
CoMa-property, then ((M;N); w) satisfies the CoMa-property.
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PROOF: Let y be an extreme point of the Core(w) and let x be the corresponding
extreme point inCore(w). Since ((M;NM ); w) satisfies the CoMa-property, there
exists an order  on (M;NM ) such that x = m(w). Then it is straightforward to
verify that any order 0 on (M;N), defined by 0(j) = (j) if j 2 M [ NM and
(j) jM [NM j otherwise, leads to the marginal vector m
0
(w) that is equal to
y. 2
As a consequence of Lemma 4.2 we can restrict our discussion in the remain-
ing part of this section to assignment games that arise from situations in which
j M j=j N j. Since then we can regard N as a disjoint copy of M, without loss
of generality we may also assume that one optimal matching between M and N
is the one that matches all identical pairs (i; i). This optimal matching will be
denoted by .
Given an assignment game ((M;N); w) and a core allocation (u; v) 2 Core(w),
in the tight graph Gw(u; v) = (V;E), the set of vertices V equals the player set
(M;N) and the edge set is defined by E = f(i; j) j i 2 M; j 2 N;ui + vj =
w(fi; jg)g. In a tight graph we distinguish between two types of edges with re-
spect to . All edges corresponding to  are referred to as thick edges and all
other edges are referred to as thin edges. Note that according to the assumption
on , we have that the thick edges are the pairs (i; i). A tight tree, which is
a subgraph of a component of a tight graph, is a tree that covers all vertices of
the component and contains all thick edges. Notice that a tight tree need not
be uniquely determined by the tight graph. The following Lemma establishes a
relation between the extreme points of an assignment game and the components
of the corresponding tight graph.
Lemma 4.3 Let ((M;N); w)be an assignment game. Then (u; v) 2 extfCore(w)g
if and only if each component of the tight graph Gw(u; v) contains at least one
player with payoff equal to zero.
PROOF: First, we show the ’only if’ part. Let (u; v) 2 extfCore(w)g and let C be
a component of Gw(u; v) in which the vertices are (S; T ). Since  is an optimal
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matching andC is connected, we have that j S j=j T j. Suppose that the restriction
of (u; v) to (S; T ), denoted by (u; v)j(S;T ), has only positive elements. Then by
Lemma 4.1, for sufficiently small  > 0 we have that the vectors x; y 2 IRS RT
defined by xi = ui + , yi = ui    for all i 2 S; xj = vj   ; yj = vj +  for all





y = (u; v)j(S;T ). This implies that
also (u; v) itself can be written as a convex combination of two different vectors
in Core(w), which contradicts the fact that (u; v) 2 extfCore(w)g. Hence, the
’only if’ part of the Lemma follows.
To see the ’if’ part, we have to show that the system
u(S) + v(T )  w((S; T )) for all S M;T  N; (2)
contains 2 j M j tight equations that are linear independent. Assume that the
tight graph Gw(u; v) can be partitioned in k components, say C1; C2; :::; Ck. Each
component Ci contains a tight tree. Then the system of equations, generated by
the edges of such a tree, is a linear independent system (cf. [1]). Hence, we have
Pk
i=1(j Ci j  1) linear independent tight equations. Combining these equations
with the tight equation in each component, that is generated by the player with
zero payoff, we obtain a system of
Pk
i=1(j Ci j) = 2 j M j linear independent
equations. Hence, we can conclude that (u; v) 2 extfCore(w)g. 2
The following Lemma provides the worth of some specific (r   s)-path coali-
tions. Here, an (r   s)-path coalition consists of all players that are contained
in the path between r and s in a tight graph, where r and s are both in the same
component.
Lemma 4.4 Let (u; v) be an extreme point of the core of an assignment game
((M;N); w) and let (r  s) be a path in a tight tree of Gw(u; v) such that vertex r
corresponds to a player that has a payoff equal to zero in (u; v). If S is an (r  s)





PROOF: Let  be the complete matching that covers S, except r in case the
cardinality of S is odd, and consists only of edges contained in the (r   s) path.
Without loss of generality we may assume that u1 corresponds to the vertex r, i.e.
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u1 = 0. Then from the definition of , the definition of a tight graph, and the
























vj  w(S): (5)
Combining (4) and (5) completes the proof. 2
Now, we can present the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.5 Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property.
PROOF: Let (u; v) be an extreme point of an assignment game ((M;N); w). We
have to show that there exists some order  on the player set (M;N) such that the
corresponding marginal vector m(w) coincides with (u; v). First we prove the
case when the tight graph Gw(u; v) is connected, i.e. the tight graph consists of
only one component. Let Tw(u; v) be a tight tree of Gw(u; v) and let x = (u; v)
be such that xi corresponds to the payoff of player i. Then Lemma 4.3 implies
that there exists a vertex r in the tight tree, in which player r has a payoff equal
to zero. Next, we will label the vertices in the tight tree via a depth first search
procedure. More specifically, initially all vertices in the tight tree are unlabeled.
In the following procedure we label the vertices by the increasing sequencing of
numbers 1; 2; :::; 2 jM j.
Step 1: give vertex r label 1.
Step 2: let a be the vertex that is labeled last, say by k;
Procedure:
(i) if there exist a thin edge that connects a with an unlabeled vertex b, then give
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vertex b label k + 1, and repeat Step 2; otherwise go to (ii)
(ii) if there exists a thick edge that connects awith an unlabeled vertex b, then give
vertex b label k + 1, and repeat Step 2; otherwise go to (iii)
(iii) if there exists no edge that connectsawith an unlabeled vertex then return to the
lowest labeled vertex b that is connected with a, set a:=b and repeat the Procedure.
Let  be the order on the players that is generated by the labels assigned in the
described depth first search procedure. We will show that m(w) = x. Let Sj be






Let player m be the player that is labeled last in Sj . Then coalition Sj can be
partitioned in Sj(1) and Sj(2), where Sj(1) are the players on the unique path






Obviously, the proof is completed if Sj(2) = ;. Hence, we may assume that
Sj(2) 6= ;. We now show that there exists a matching on Sj(2) that consists only
of thick edges and covers Sj(2). Let a 2 Sj(1) and let b 2 Sj(2) be such that
(a; b) is an edge in the tight tree. Since there exists a path from a to m, there are at
least three edges incident to a. Since vertex b is visited using edge (a; b) before m
is visited, it follows from item (i) in the depth first search procedure that (a; b) has
to be a thin edge. Obviously, all vertices in Sj(2) are labeled before m is labelled
the depth first search procedure. Since each vertex is incident to a thick edge, we
can conclude that there exists indeed a matching of Sj(2) that consists only of






since the optimal matching is provided by the thick edges. Now, we have













where the first inequality holds since the merger of optimal matchings of Sj(1) and
Sj(2) gives a matching for Sj , the first equality holds by (7) and (8), the second
equality since Sj(1) and Sj(2) form a partition of Sj and the second inequality
holds since x is in the core of the assignment game.
From (6) it follows immediately that
mj+1(w) = w(Sj+1)  w(Sj) = xj+1;
which completes the proof in case the tight graph consists of one component.
Second, we prove the case in which the tight graph consists of more than one
component. Suppose Gw(u; v) consists of k components, say C1; :::; Ck. Then
from the first part it follows that there exists an order i on the player set Si of Ci
such that mi(w) = xjSi for all 1  i  k. Then it is straightforward to show that
m(w) = x where  = (1; 2; :::; k). 2
The following example illustrates the outcome of the procedure used in the
proof of Theorem 4.5 and shows that an extreme point can be generated by several
marginal vectors.
Example 4.6 Let x = (0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1) be an extreme point of the core of an
assignment game (N;w). A tight tree that corresponds to x is depicted in figure
4.1. The weight of an edge is 1 if the edge is contained in the tight tree and 0










Figure 4.1: the tight graph Gw(x).
Then the procedure, starting in the vertex corresponding to player 1, can give the
order  = (1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8) and  = (1; 6; 7; 2; 3; 4; 5; 8), respectively. Then
it is easy to verify that m(w) = m

(w) = x.
From the observations in Example 4.6 we propose the following allocation rule
for a game (N;w) that satisfies the CoMa-property:
(w) =
1




Obviously, if (N;w) is convex, then  equals the Shapley value. Otherwise  can
be considered as a generalized Shapley value with the property that its outcome is
in the bary center of the core.
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